

Message Text

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SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 10110

ANKARA FRO DELIVERY TO NATO DEPARTMENT TURKISH FORIEGN
MINISTRY

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: MBFR PLENARY MEETING DEC. 7

1. THE MBFR CONFERENCE PLENARY MEETING ON DEC 7 UNDER UK
CHAIRMANSHIP HEARD ONLY ONE STATEMENT, THAT OF THE GDR
REP (AMB. OESER). HIS PRESENTATION CONSISTED OF

ADVOCACY OF THE NOV 8 EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT
COMBINED WITH A COMPARATIVE CRITIQUE OF THE ALLIED PROPOSAL OF
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NOV 22. NO NEW ELEMENTS WERE INHRODUCED. THE NEXT PLENARY

MEETING WILL BE HELD DEC 11 WITH THE US IN THE CHAIR.

2. TEXT OF GDR STATEMENT FOLLOWS:

GEGIN TEXT: THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE CHanneled THEIR CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS DURING THE PAST PLENARY MEETINGS TO DIRECT THE NEGOTIATIONS QUICKLY AND TOWARDS CONCRETE WORKING RESULTS.

THE FOUR DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING SOCIALIST STATES ALREADY TABLED ON 8 NOV A DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH CONTAINS EXACT STIPULATIONS REGARDING THE EXTENT, THE TIMEING, AND THE METHOD OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES. THE DELEGATION OF THE GDR JOINTLY WITH THE DELEGATIONS OF THE OTHER SOCIALIST STATES PROVED IN DETAIL AND EXPLAINED THAT THIS DRAFT AGREEMENT RESPONDS TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTICIPATING STATES BY PROVIDING FOR AN EVEN AND SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES INCLUSIVE OF NECLEAR EQUIPPED UNITS WHICH ARE STATIONED IN THE REDUCTION AREA.

EVEN THOUGH OUR DELEGATION WOULD HAVE BEEN GLADLY PREPARED TO WELCOME PROPOSALS OF A GENERAL DRAFT OUTLINE PROPOSAL OF THE WESTERN STATES, WE HAVE TO SAY THAT THE STUDY OF THESE PROPOSALS UNFORTUNATELY LED US TO CONCLUDE THAT THEY CONTRADICT THE MUTUALLY AGREED PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AND THEREBY PAY NO ATTENTION TO THE BASIC CRITIQUE WHICH THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE ALREADY MADE TO THE PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED CONCEPTS OF THE WESTERN SIDE. ALSO THE STATEMENT OF THE GDR DELEGATION WHICH WAS MADE ON THE 28TH OF NOV WHICH CRITICIZED THESE CONCEPTS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL REMAINS: THESE PROPOSALS ARE DIRECTED TOWARDS A ONE-SIDED CHANGE OF THE FORCE RATIOS TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPATING STATES. THIS ALREADY IS APPARENT THAT THEY DEMAND UNCOMPARABLY LARGER REDUCTIONS FOR THE SOCIALIST STATES THAN FOR THEMSELVES. LEADING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPATING STATES, AS HAS BEEN RECALLED HERE ON THE PART OF THE DELEGATES FROM THE SOCIALIST STATES, STREESED UNTIL VERY RECENTLY THE EXISTENCE OF A MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. THEREFORE THE ASSERTION OF WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES IS EVEN HARDER TO UNDERSTAND WHEN THEY CLAIM THAT THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST STATES IS NOT BEING DIMINISHED WHEN THE FORCE RATIO IS BEING ONE SIDEDLY REDUCED IN THEIR DISFAVOR. THE DELEGATION OF THE GDR
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ASKS THEREFORE THE WESTERN PARTICIPATING STATES NOT JUST TO PAY LIP SERVICE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY IN WORDS BUT ALSO TO ARRIVE AT REALISTIC STARTING POSITIONS WHICH WOULD MAKE IT REALLY POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES. IN RECENT HISTORY POSITIVE RESULTS WERE ACHIEVED IN NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE ALL PARTIES STARTED OUT FROM THE REAL SITUATION AS IT EXISTS IN EUROPE AND BY RESPECTING THE INTERESTS

OF ALL PARTIES. THIS ADVANCED THE CONFIDENCE AMONG STATES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL ORDERS AND DISTINCTLY CONTRIBUTED TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THEM. IF OUR NEGOTIATIONS ARE BASED IN THE SAME MANNER ON THE REALITIES AND INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO ACHIEVE PRACTICAL RESULTS OF MILITARY DETENTE WHICH WILL SUPPLEMENT POLITICAL DETENTE AND NOT WORK AGAINST IT.

THE DELEGATION OF THE GDR WILL ALWAYS WORK IN THE CONSULTATIONS WITH THIS IDEA IN MIND. IT DOES NOT DEMAND A CHANGE IN THE MILITARY FORCE RATIO IN FAVOR OF THE SOCIALIST STATES. THIS WOULD BE UNPRODUCTIVE. THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN THE SPIRIT OF COEXISTENCE AND LEAD TO AGREEMENTS MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TO ALL.

IN THE INTERESTS OF FURTHER DETENTE CONCENTRATION OF MILITARY FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD BE DIMINISHED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THE PRESENTLY EXISTING FORCE RATIO AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS REMAINS UNTOUCHED. THE SOLUTION OF THIS TASK OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS DEMANDS THE UTILIZATION OF A METHOD WHICH INSURES A JUST AND EQUAL REDUCTION OF THOSE ARMED FORCES OF ALL DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES WHICH ARE STATIONED IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THIS WE WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS IN SOMEWHAT MORE DETAIL TODAY.

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ANKARA FOR DELIVERY TO NATO DEPARTMENT TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

AS WE HAVE ALREADY EXPLAINED SUCH A METHOD IS BEING ADVANCED IN ARTICLE 1 OF THE 8 NOVEMBER 1973 DRAFT PROPOSAL OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST STATES. THIS ARTICLE PROVIDES FOR THE REDUCTION OF FOREIGN AS WELL AS NATIONAL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES ON THE BASIS OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS AND IN FIRMLY ESTABLISHED TIME PERIODS IN A MANNER WHICH DOES NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF ANY OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES.

THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS ON AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE BASIS WHICH AT THE SAME TIME ACCOUNTS AS ALL ELEMENTS OF THE CONCERNED ALLIED FORCES - GROUND AND AIR FORCES INCLUDING CONFIDENTIAL

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THE TROOP DETACHMENTS AND UNITS WHICH ARE EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR ARMS AS FORESEEN IN ARTICLE 2 INSURES THAT THE SECURITY OF EVERY PARTNER REMAINS PRESERVED ON THIS LEVEL AS IT HAD EXISTED PRIOR TO THE REDUCTION.

IN THIS MANNER THE METHOD OF REDUCTION PROPOSED IN ARTICLE 1 AND 2 OF THE DRAFT PROPOSAL GUARANTEES THE CONSERVATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES AND THE MUTUALITY OF REDUCTION.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PROPOSED METHOD OF THE 22 NOVEMBER OUTLINE PROPOSAL LEADS TO RESULTS WHICH VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR THE SOCIALIST STATES IN A DRASTIC MANNER. HOW ELSE SHOULD ONE EVALUATE THE WESTERN DRAFT PROPOSAL WHICH FORESEES FOR THE FIRST PHASE:

A REDUCTION OF THE GROUND FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION BY 29,000 AND OF THE SOVIET UNION BY 68,000 MEN. THAT IS A RATIO OF 1 TO 2.4 AND

WHERE US SOLDIERS ARE BEING WITHDRAWN AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN SMALL GROUPS WITHOUT THEIR TOTAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION IS SUPPOSED TO REDUCE A TANK ARMY WITH 1,700 TANKS. IN THIS MANNER A REDUCTION OF TANKS IN A RATIO OF 0 TO 1,700 IS BEING DEMANDED.

AT THE SAME TIME THE WESTERN PROPOSAL DOES NOT PROVIDE AT ALL FOR A REDUCTION OF AIR FORCES OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNITS EVEN THOUGH THEY CONSTITUTE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT MILITARY POTENTIAL IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION AND THE GREATEST DANGER OF NUCLEAR ESCALATION EMANATES FROM THEM.

IT IS KNOWN THAT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE CONCENTRATED AN EXCEEDINGLY LARGE AMOUNT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR DELIVERY MEANS IN THE REDUCTION AREA WHICH REPRESENT THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE PEOPLES OF CENTRAL EUROPE.

REDUCTION METHODS WITH SUCH ONE-SIDED EFFECTS ARE CLEARLY UNSUITED TO LEAD US TOWARDS MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND EQUITABLE AGREEMENTS.

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FOR THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS THE WESTERN PROPOSAL CONTAINS ONLY ONE CONCRETE THOUGHT: THE SOCIALIST STATES SHALL UNDERWRITE IN ADVANCE AN OTHERWISE TOTALLY NEBULOUS PHASE THAT APPLIES THE SAME METHOD OF ENSURING UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR THEM.

THE BUSINESSLIKE AND FAIR PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST STATES, ON THE OTHER HAND, PROVIDES FOR THE OBSERVANCE OF THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 28, 1973 WHICH STATES "THAT SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS...IN ALL RESPECTS AND AT EVERY POINT CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY."

ARTICLE 2 OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE SOCIALIST STATES PROVIDES FOR SUCH A TIME PHASING OF REDUCTIONS WHICH AT NO POINT IN TIME CAN LEAD TO A CHANGE IN THE FORCE RELATIONSHIP. THE REDUCTION APPLIES AT ALL TIMES IN EQUAL SCOPE TO ALL TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND TO ALL DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES. THIS REDUCTION METHOD DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY PARTY TO CHANGE THE STRUCTURE OF ITS ARMED FORCES AND TAKES FULLY INTO ACCOUNT THE DIFFERENCE IN CONTRIBUTION BY ANY GIVEN ALLY TO THE TOTAL STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES, AS WELL AS THE SIZE OF CONTRIBUTION OF GROUND AND AIR FORCE COMPONENTS AND OF UNITS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR ARMS OF THE ARMIES IN QUESTION. IN THIS WAY ONE WOULD PRESERVE AT ALL TIMES THE STABLE TOTAL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES DURING THE REDUCTION PROCESS AND THE REDUCTIONS THUS UNDERTAKEN WOULD FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE STABILITY AND DETENTE IN EUROPE.

THERE IS NO SIMPLER WAY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT THAT WILL SERVE THESE GOALS AND WILL PROVIDE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS AT THE SAME TIME. ONE CANNOT ACCEPT THE ASSERTIONS THAT UNILATERAL PROPOSALS WHICH VIOLATE THE SECURITY OF SOME PARTICIPANTS ARE MORE

EFFECTIVE. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE PUBLIC OPINION OF OUR COUNTRIES
WILL SHARE THIS VIEW.

THE PROPOSAL, TO START WITH A SYMBOLIC REDUCTION OF ALL THE
ARMED FORCES STATIONED IN THE REDUCTION AREA WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE
TO INTRODUCE PRACTICAL MEASURES ALREADY IN 1975 AND TO PREPARE FOR
FURTHER REDUCTION USING THIS AS A TREND-SETTING EXAMPLE. IN 1976
THERE WOULD BE A 5 PERCENT REDUCTION FOLLOWING THE SAME FUND-
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AMENTAL PRINCIPLE, AND AN ADDITIONAL 10 PERCENT REDUCTION IN 1977
THUS COMPLEMENTING THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL DETENTE BY CORRES-
PONDING MILITARY MEASURES.

THE TWESTERN SEPARATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS INTO TWO PHASES
CANNOT BE COMPARED WITH THE STEP-WISE REALIZATION OF THE AGREED
REDUCTION. IT WILLFULLY TEARS APART THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS
AND CONTRADICTS THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.
BY SEPARATING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF US AND USSR
GROUND FORCES FROM THE CORRESPONDING NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTION
MEASURES

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 VIENNA 10110

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY TO NATO DEPARTMENT TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

IN A SECOND PHASE ONE IGNORES THE CLOSE INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXISTING COALITION OF ARMED FORCES ON BOTH SIDES. IN PARTICULAR, THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY USSR TO THE DEFENSE OF THE SOCIALIST STATES AND THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY BORNE BY THE USSR AND USA, LAST BUT NOT LEAST AN NUCLEAR POWERS, DO NOT ALLOW THAT THE REDCUTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA BE CONSIDERED IN ISOLATION FROM THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ALLIED FORCES ON BOTH SIDES.

IN CONTRAST TO THE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE SOCIALIST STATES WHICH CLEARLY OUTLINES THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF ANY GIVEN REDUCTION, CONFIDENTIAL

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THE WESTERN OUTLINE PROPOSAL LEAVES ALL THE SUBSTANTIVE REDUCTIONS QUESTIONS OF THE SECOND PHASE OPEN. A PROPOSAL WHICH DOES NOT ANSWER THE QUESTION ABOUT THE SCOPE OF REDUCTION ON THE PART OF THE MAJORITY OF PARTICIPANTS, AND WHICH ALSO MAKES THE POSTPONEMENT OF REDUCTIONS FOR AN UNDETERMINED LENGTH OF TIME POSSIBLE, CANNOT HELP SOLVE THE PROBLEMS FACING THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

ARTICLE 3 OF THE SOCIALIST STATES DRAFT PORPOSAL FURTHER STATES THAT THE REDUCTION OF FOREIGN AS WELL AS NATIONAL FORCES WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN SUCH A WAY THAT WHOL UNITS OF APPROXIMATELY THE SAME KIND AND TYPE WILL BE REDUCED ON EACH SIDE. STARTING WITH THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF MODERN ARMED FORCES IS NOT DETERMINED BY THE NUMBER OF SOLDIERS, BUT, MOST OF ALL BY THE INTERACTION OF WELL TRAINED SOLDIERS WITH MOST MODERN WEAPONS AND COMBAT TECHNIQUES AND BY THEIR INTEGRATION IN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES WHICH CORRESPOND TO THE PURPOSE AND THE TECHNICAL APPLICABILITY OF SEPARATE WEAPON SYSTEMS.

THEREFORE A REDUCTION METHOD MUST BE BASED ON THE COMBAT CAPABILILTY OF SEPARATE TYPE OF ARMED FORCES, ON THEIR BRANCH OF SERVICE AND ON THEIR STRUCTURE. THEREFORE A FORCE REDUCTION ONLY MAKES SENSE WHEN A REDUCTION OF WHICH ORGANIZATION, TROOP ELEMENTS OR UNITS IS PROVIDED FOR. THIS METHOD ENSURES THAT

ALL COMBAT UNITS IN QUESTION ARE COVERED BY THE REDUCTION AND THAT THE INTERESTS OF ALL SIDES ARE BEING TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. OF COURSE, THIS IS NOT A SIMPLE UNDERTAKING, BUT ALL THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE AGREED TO APPLY THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND THOROUGH METHODS TO THE DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER WITH DUE CONSIDERATION OF ITS COMPLEXITY AND BY DOING SO TO GUARANTEE AT THE SAME TIME UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH SIDE. IN CONTRAST, THE WESTERN SIDE PROPOSES - AS WE HAVE SEEN - THAT NATO SHOULD REDUCE BY WITHDRAWING INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS OR SMALL UNITS WHILE THE SOCIALIST STATES SHOULD REDUCE BY WHOLE DIVISIONS. SUCH AN APPROACH CLEARLY CONTRADICTS THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY AND DIMINISHES THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST STATES. THEREFORE WE REPEAT ALSO IN THIS CONNECTION THAT AN ISOLATED VIEW OF THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF SEPARATE ARMED FORCES CANNOT BE USED AS A YARDSTICK FOR REDUCTIONS. THIS AMOUNTS TO A DISTORTION OF THE PROBLEM WHICH WILL LEAD TO AN UNPRODUCTIVE ARGUMENT.

MR. CHAIRMAN,
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THE USE OF THE METHOD CONTAINED IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE SOCIALIST STATES FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS ENSURES THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES AND ALLOWS US TO COME TO CONCRETE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE RESULTS. WE RECOMMEND AN AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION OF ALL ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE ON THE PROPOSED PHASING OF REDUCTION, AND ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS ON THE BASIS OF WHOLE MILITARY UNITS. HAVING AGREED ON THESE PRINCIPLES ONE COULD IMMEDIATELY START CONCRETE CONSULTATIONS ON WHAT SHOULD BE REDUCED ON BOTH SIDES. THIS WE REGARD AS A REALISTIC PATH TO AN AGREEMENT. WE ARE READY TO FOLLOW THIS PATH.

THE GDR DELEGATION TOGETHER WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS FROM SOCIALIST STATES IS FOR A SETTLEMENT OF MUTUAL BENEFIT, WHICH DOES LEAD TO FURTHER DETENTE ON OUR CONTINENT, AND WHICH CAN BE WORKED OUT AND SIGNED WITHOUT DELAY IF ALL SIDES SHOULD ADOPT A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE. END TEXT
HUMES

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